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Abstract 
This paper describes and explains some of the principal trends in the wage and skill 
distribution in recent decades. There have been sharp increases in wage inequality across the 
OECD, beginning with the US and UK at the end of the 1970s. A good fraction of this 
inequality growth is due to technology-related increases in the demand for skilled workers 
outstripping the growth of their supply. Since the early 1990s, labour markets have become 
more polarized with jobs in the middle third of the wage distribution shrinking and those in 
the bottom and top third rising. I argue that this is because computerization complements the 
most skilled tasks, but substitutes for routine tasks performed by middle wage occupations 
such as clerks, leaving the demand for the lowest skilled service tasks largely unaffected. 
Finally, I argue that technology is partly endogenous, for example it has been spurred by 
trade with China. Thus, trade does matter for changes in the labour market through inducing 
faster technical change rather than just through the conventional Heckscher-Ohlin 
mechanism.  
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1. Introduction 
Understanding changes in the wage distribution has been a major topic of research in labour 
economics over the last two decades. The stimulus for this was the huge rise in wage inequality that 
began in the late 1970s in the US and the UK. Adam Smith focused on human capital as an 
explanation for the inequality of the wage structure and the economics profession has continued in this 
spirit when examining recent changes. 
“A man educated at the expense of much labour and time to any of those employments which 
require extraordinary dexterity and skill, may be compared to one of those expensive machines. 
The work which he learns to perform, it must be expected, over and above the usual wages of 
common labour, will replace to him the whole expense of his education, with at least the 
ordinary profits of an equally valuable capital.”1
In this paper I revisit these classic debates in light of new evidence accumulated over the first decade 
of the 21st Century. I focus on three themes: the importance of the canonical demand and supply 
model, polarization and the roles of trade-induced technical change. 
 
 
I argue that the canonical demand and supply model does a reasonable job at explaining the main 
trends in inequality between skill groups. There has been an ongoing demand shift towards skilled 
labour (driven by technical change) which was kept in check over most of the 20th Century by 
increases in the supply of educated workers. It was only when the accumulation of US human capital 
slowed down that inequality began its secular increase in the last quarter of the 20th Century (see 
Goldin and Katz, 2008). Thus there is a role for both demand and supply trends in accounting for 
changing inequality. 
 
Although US and UK wage inequality rose monotonically in the 1980s, since the early 1990s a better 
description would be “polarization”. In the latter period, upper tail inequality, the ln(wage) difference 
between the 90th percentile and the median (the “90-50”) has continued to rise, but lower tail inequality 
(the “50-10” ln(wage) difference between the median and the 10th percentile)  has reversed or 
stabilized. In all OECD countries, there has been a fall in the share of occupations in the middle of the 
wage distribution. Not only have high quality jobs grown (bankers, lawyers, architects and 
economists), so have low quality jobs in the bottom third of the wage distribution (cleaners, restaurant 
waiting staff, hairdressers, etc.). It has been the middle who seem to be losing out. I argue that 
technology may also be the explanation here – Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) 
                                                 
1 Wealth of Nations, Book I, Chapter10, “Of Wages and Profit in the Different Employments of Labour and Stock” I.10.9  
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substitutes for routine tasks which were originally manual jobs (like assembly line workers), but 
increasingly, so have been non-manual jobs (like clerks). Non-routine manual jobs are largely 
unaffected. There is more direct and indirect evidence for this task-based explanation accumulating. 
 
The third aspect I focus on is the need to endogenize technical change. I focus on the idea that 
although trade with less developed countries may not have much direct effect on inequality, it may 
have a large indirect effect through stimulating faster innovation and diffusion. I describe recent work 
which uses the growth of China as the major example of an increase in import competition with a low 
wage country. There is good evidence that major shocks (such as the removal of quotas following 
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization) has a strong effect on inducing technical change 
and thereby altering the structure of skill demand. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes some of the major changes in OECD 
labour markets (focusing on the US and UK) and Section 3 discusses how well these can be explained 
in a basic supply and demand framework. Section 4 then examines the more recent evidence on 
polarization since the 1990s and the task-based view of technical change that seeks to explain this 
trend. I discuss trade-induced technical change in section 5 before drawing some conclusions in 
Section 6. 
 
One caveat to be mentioned at the outset is that in this paper I will focus on demand-supply factors 
rather than labour market institutions, such as trade unions and minimum wages. This is not because I 
think institutions are unimportant, indeed I have written much on their relevance (e.g. Draca, Machin 
and Van Reenen, 2011). However, in terms of these major long-term trends, many of the similarities 
across countries suggests to me that country-specific institutions are unlikely to be the fundamental 
causes of such changes, as institutions differ so much between nations. In fact the institutions 
themselves may adapt to changes in the economic environment2
 
.  
 
2. Descriptive evidence on recent trends in relative wages and skills  
2.1 Wage Inequality  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of US male wage inequality since the Great Depression taken from 
Goldin and Katz (2008). It follows a “U-shape” with a fall in inequality from the 1935 to the mid 
                                                 
2 For more on the role of institutions see DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) or Lee (1999). 
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1950s and then stability until the 1970s whereupon inequality took off and has continued rising ever 
since. There is broadly a similar pattern whether we use the Gini coefficient or the “90-10”, the 
difference between ln(wages) at the 90th percentile and 10th percentile. Inequality rose faster from late 
1970s to the late 1980s than subsequently, but from a historical perspective the continued secular trend 
increase is remarkable. 
 
 
The same broad pattern is observed in the UK in Figure 2 with inequality rising pretty consistently 
since the late 1970s, albeit a bit faster for men than women. The level of UK inequality is still much 
lower than in the US, however. Figure 3 puts the UK and US into an international context looking at 
other OECD countries where similar time series can be constructed. Panel 3A shows the well known 
fact that inequality rose much faster in the US and UK in the 1980s than the other nations. Looking at 
data from 1990 to 2008 in Panel 3B, however, suggests that the UK and US are not out of line with 
experience in other OECD countries inequality rose across all countries save France. Indeed, in 
Australia, Denmark, Germany and New Zealand inequality rose by more than in the UK.  
 
Atkinson et al (2010) have also noted that the trend of inequality has become more widespread since 
the 1990s. The stylized fact that the US and UK were radically different from other countries in their 
wage inequality trends no longer holds. 
 
2.2 Polarization 
The changes in the wage distribution have actually become more complex to describe in recent years. 
Figure 4 plots out US wage growth at difference points of the distribution for two periods, 1974-1988 
and 1988 to 2005 (these are taken from repeated cross sections so are not the same workers of course). 
In the earlier period pre 1988 there is a monotonic growth of inequality. Wage growth for workers at 
the median was broadly zero; it was negative (real wage cuts) below the median and positive for only 
those above the median. This is what led to a strong and secular growth of inequality 
 
By contrast, if we look at the post 1988 period there is a non-monotonic “twist” of the wage 
distribution. The top of the wage distribution continues to become more unequal with the 90th 
percentile pulling further away from the median, albeit with the median enjoying some positive wage 
growth. By contrast, the bottom 20% of wage earners actually saw faster wage growth than those 
around the middle of the distribution (although much slower than those at the top). This has been 
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described by some as “polarization” as the middle is losing out to both the top and the bottom of the 
wage distribution over this period.  
 
Another way to illustrate these differential wage trends since the 1980s is to decompose the 90-10 into 
the 90-50 and the 50-10. This is done in Figure 5 for the US (Panel A) and UK (Panel B). In both 
countries upper tail inequality (the 90-50) has had a remarkable and continuous increase since the 
1970s with the richest 10% pulling away from the middle of the distribution. The picture for the 
bottom half of the wage distribution is very different. Although the median pulled away from the 
lowest decile throughout the 1980s, from the late 1980s this went into reverse with the bottom decile 
narrowing the gap with the median. The UK is picture is less extreme but still suggests some 
polarization: the 50-10 stops rising in the mid 1990s and narrows slightly after 1998. 
 
 
Rather than focusing on wages, we can also examine polarization through the changing pattern of 
employment. Goos and Manning (2007) were the first to point to the phenomenon of “lovely and lousy 
jobs”, i.e. that low wage occupations had actually grown in importance alongside very high wage 
occupations. “Middle class” jobs in the centre of the occupational distribution were shrinking. They 
used UK data to illustrate this and Figure 6 repeats their analysis using more recent data through 2008. 
Following Goos and Manning (2007) it is possible to rank all occupations by their average wage in 
1979 to get an indicator of “job quality”. The idea is that higher paying jobs indicate a higher quality. 
Giving every worker the average wage in his or her occupation enables us to look at deciles of the 
occupational distribution and examine how the proportion of total employment in each type of job 
changes over time. From Figure 6 we can see that there was substantial growth in the share of the top 
two deciles of the occupational distribution (lawyers, bankers, management consultants, economists, 
etc.). More surprisingly, there was also a growth in the share of occupations in the bottom decile of the 
wage distribution (hairdressers, cleaners, supermarket shelf-stackers and check-out workers, etc.). 
Occupations in the middle deciles of the wage distribution, especially in the sixth to eight deciles, 
declined in importance. Both lovely and lousy jobs (the bottom and top of the occupational 
distribution) have become more important over time. 
 
Remarkably, this pattern is observed in essentially every OECD country. Splitting up the occupational 
distribution into terciles, the middle wage group has shrunk in every nation (see Figure 7). This 
suggests that polarization is a general pattern across the industrialized world since the early 1990s. 
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2.3 Extreme Wage Inequality 
Most datasets have limited information on the top 1% of wage earners. The US Current Population 
survey, for example, top codes high wages making it impossible to analyse trends for the very rich. In 
a series of papers Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011) have analysed trends for the top of the income 
distribution over long periods using administrative tax records. Table 8 shows an example of this type 
of analysis where we plot the share of all income (income from capital as well as labour earnings) 
accruing to the top 1% for the English speaking countries. The “U” shaped picture displayed in Figure 
1 is also apparent across the sweep of the last 100 years, with the last quarter of the 20th century 
standing out as a period of rising inequality. Atkinson et al (2011) show that the growth of the share of 
the top 1% is more muted in non-English speaking countries, but appears to be on the increase in the 
last decade. 
 
A large fraction of the overall increase in the variance of earnings in the UK and US in the last two 
decades is due to what is happening at the top of the income distribution. For example, Bell and Van 
Reenen (2010) show that between 1998 and 2008 the top decile increased its share of the UK wage bill 
from 27% to 30%, the majority of this going to the top 1%. 
 
The reasons for the growth in extreme wage inequality is much less well understood than for the main 
part of the wage distribution. The pattern could just reflect wider trends towards the growth of 
inequality (e.g. increasing demands for skills). Or it could be driven by more of a “winner take all” 
economy where talent can be leveraged over a greater scale due to increased communications and 
larger firms (e.g. Gabaix and Landier, 2008, on CEO pay3
 
). Atkinson et al (2011) stress changes in 
social norms whereas Bell and Van Reenen (2010) focus on the importance of incentive pay in the 
financial sector. 
2.4 Education differentials and within group inequality 
Increased returns to human capital are an important part of the story of increasing inequality and will 
be a focus of this paper. Figure 9 shows the (composition adjusted) relative wages of college workers 
                                                 
3 They emphasise that globalization has enabled the average size of publicly listed US firms to expand and so allow more 
talented CEOs to leverage their ability over larger units. The problem with this argument, however, is that publicly listed 
US firms also grew in size substantially in the 1950s and CEO did not explode. 
7 
 
to high school graduates in the US since the mid 1960s. There was a small increase in the return to 
human capital in the 1963-1970 period followed by a reversal of this through to 1979 - the period 
when Richard Freeman wrote about “The Overeducated American” (Freeman, 1976). Since then the 
returns to being a college graduate have been on a secular increase, just like the upper half of the wage 
distribution. There is a similar pattern in the UK (Machin and Van Reenen, 2010). 
 
 
Some fraction of the increase in wage inequality is certainly due to increasing returns to skill. But even 
within skill groups there is a substantial fraction of residual wage inequality that cannot be accounted 
for by the standard observables (experience, education and gender).  Different writers put a differential 
stress on the importance of this “within group” increase in inequality (e.g. Acemoglu and Autor, Autor 
et al, 2008). Although in standard May CPS analysis about two-thirds of the increase in wage 
inequality is “within groups”, Lemieux (2006) argues that this is mainly due to increasing 
measurement error and compositional changes.  One view of increasing within group inequality is that 
it is simply a reflection of the returns to human capital (e.g. Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993, suggest an 
increase in the return to unobservable skills). Other possibilities are that it reflects increased wage 
volatility as there is more mobility up and down income levels. The lower growth of consumption 
inequality compared to income inequality would suggest that there is some increase in uncertainty (e.g. 
Meghir and Pistaferri, 2011), as do formal decompositions of wage dynamics. There does not appear to 
be a large change in mobility around within workers’ position in the wage distribution however 
(Wojciech, Emmanuel Saez and Jae Song, 2010). 
 
Interestingly, the inequality of productivity and profitability between firms and plants also seems to 
have increased over this time period (e.g. Dunne, Foster, Haltiwanger and Troske, 2004; Brynjolfsson 
and Saunders, 2009). Figure 10 illustrates this using UK data which shows a substantial “fanning out” 
of the labour productivity distribution. One explanation for this is that the computer revolution has 
increased firm heterogeneity and if there are match-specific rents (e.g. from search frictions), some of 
the profits (and losses) will be shared with workers in the form of wages (see Caselli, 1999; Faggio, 
Salvanes and Van Reenen, 2010; Van Reenen, 1996). 
 
2.5 Summary 
This whistle-stop tour of developments in the labour market suggests a few stylized facts: 
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1. There has been a huge increase in wage inequality beginning in the 1970s in the UK and US, 
but now affecting most OECD countries since the 1990s. 
2. An important fraction of this increase in wage inequality is linked to human capital 
3. Since the early to mid 1990s there has been a polarization of the labour market with those in 
the middle of the distribution losing out to those in the bottom, as well as the top 
4. There is also a dramatic improvement in the position of the top 1% in the last quarter of the 20th 
Century, especially in the English speaking world  
5. There is substantial increase in “within skill group” inequality. 
 
I will focus on explaining stylized facts 1-3 in this paper, but return at various points to the other 
findings. 
 
3. A Framework for Understanding Recent Changes in the Labour Market 
 
3.1 The Canonical Model 
The first model in the toolkit an economist reaches for when seeking to understand these seismic shifts 
is supply and demand. It turns out this does not do too badly at explaining the broad trends. 
 
 
Figure 11 contains the “canonical model”. I consider the relative demand for two skill groups sub-
scripted: High (“H”) and low (“L”) supplied at levels HN  and LN  respectively.  On Panel A, relative 
wages of these two groups are on the y-axis and the relative employment is on the x-axis. Assuming 
for simplicity that the relative supply curve (S) is inelastic I draw this as vertical whereas the demand 
curve is downward sloping (D). Equilibrium relative wages and employment is at the intersection of 
the two curves and is at   and . In Panel B we consider an outward shift in the supply of 
human capital from S1 to S2. Holding demand fixed, we would expect this to lead to a fall in the 
relative wage from   to  since the increase in supply should depress skill premia. 
However, if relative demand has rises sufficiently (e.g. D1 to D2) it can more than offset the supply 
shift so that relative wages increase to   . 
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This is easy to illustrate algebraically. Consider a CES production function where Y is value added and 
σ  is the elasticity of substitution:  
1 1 1
(1 )H LY N N
σ
σ σ σ
σ σλ λ
− − − 
= + − 
 
                                                                   (1) 
Assume that product and input markets are perfectly competitive so the two first order conditions can 
be combined to write relative wages as: 
1ln ln ln
1
H H
L L
W N
W N
λ
λ σ
    = −    −    
                                                             (2) 
 
The term 
1
λ
λ−
 relates to the bias of technology. If we use the “Tinbergen” (1974) assumption and 
assume that this is a trend we can obtain a simple equation for the evolution of wage inequality: 
 
0 1
1ln lnH H
L L
W Ntrend
W N
γ γ
σ
   
= + −   
   
                                                           (3) 
 
The growth of relative wages will depend in the coefficient on the trend ( 1γ , “skill biased technical 
change”) and the growth of supply of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers. The degree to 
which the latter depressed wage inequality will depend on the size of the elasticity of substitution (σ ) 
between the two skill groups. In the Cobb-Douglas case σ  = 1 so the wage bill share is a summary 
statistic for the demand for skilled workers (see sub-section 4.2 below). 
 
Katz and Murphy (1992) estimated equation (3) on US time series data and found that the elasticity of 
substitution was about 1.4  and the trend was about 3.3% per annum ( 1γ  = 0.03). 
 
3.2 What caused the shift in demand? 
A major problem with equation (3) of course is that there is no economic interpretation of what causes 
the unexplained trend, the demand shift for skilled workers. There are two obvious candidates: trade or 
technology. First, trade with less developed countries (like China) could have depressed the demand 
for unskilled workers through Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson effects. Although attractively 
simple and very popular in media and policy circles, the empirical evidence has tended to be against 
the trade-based explanations. We will discuss this in more detail in section 5 below, where we show 
10 
 
how a more subtle version of the trade story may be at play, with trade inducing faster technical 
change.  
 
The second and dominant explanation for the increase in demand for skill is technology or SBTC (skill 
biased technical change). New technologies, especially information and communications technologies 
(ICT) enabled skilled workers to do their jobs much more effectively – for example, architects could 
focus on design - planning out buildings through using computer-generated images of their future 
buildings (e.g. AutoCAD) rather than measuring and drawing up by hand. By contrast, ICT replaced 
the jobs of many unskilled manual workers: robots replacing assembly line workers, for example. 
More generally, with any new technologies, more educated workers were better at dealing with the 
uncertainty over how best to implement these new ideas. In short, technology is a complement for 
human capital. 
 
A major challenge to the SBTC hypothesis, however, is that technology has been trundling along for 
several hundred years. Why should it suddenly have started causing increases in inequality in the last 
quarter of the Twentieth Century (e.g. Card and DiNardo, 2002)? One story is that the direction of 
technical change may have changed to become more skill biased. Clearly, some technologies before 
the 20th Century such as the factory movement and the spinning jenny seemed to de-skill artisans. But 
analysis of electricity and other developments in the early 20th Century suggest that these were also 
favourable to skilled workers (see Goldin and Katz, 2008). Alternatively, one could also argue that the 
direction of technical change remains the same, but the rate of technical change accelerated. But 
OECD productivity growth actually slowed after the 1970s oil shocks and did not pick up again (in the 
US) until the mid 1990s, a long time after the initial burst of inequality (e.g. Bloom, Sadun and Van 
Reenen, 2011). 
 
The right way to interpret equation (3) is that SBTC is a long-run trend which is causing upwards 
pressure on skill prices. In Machin and Van Reenen (1998) for example, we regressed the change in 
the wage bill share of skilled workers on various indicators for technology, such as lagged R&D 
intensity. We found a strong positive relationship in all seven OECD countries we examined, 
suggesting a long-run trend towards SBTC.  Increases in the supply of skills are needed in order to 
counterbalance the pressure that technology has to increase inequality. Under this view wage 
inequality is the outcome of a “race” between technology and education using the felicitous expression 
of Tinbergen (1974) which gives the title to the book by Goldin and Katz (2008). Technology is 
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driving a moving escalator of inequality upwards and increases in the supply of skill through the 
education system are necessary to maintain or reduce the current amount of inequality. 
 
Card and Lemieux (2001) emphasised this in the modern debate when they analysed the slowdown in 
the rate of growth of education in recent cohorts Americans. They argued that it was this slowdown in 
the supply of skills which was the main culprit behind increases in the skill premium. 
[Figure 12 about here] 
 
Figure 12 makes this point in stark form. It plots out the mean years of schooling for US born4
 
 cohorts 
at age 30 (so 1980 represents the mean years of schooling for the cohort of American born in 1980 still 
living in the US). From 1870 onwards there is a large and secular increase in the educational 
attainment of Americans. This started slowing down in the 1950s, so for cohorts entering the labour 
market from around the 1970s there was a relative shortage of more educated potential workers (given 
the ongoing change in technologies).  
Thus, the analysis in Figure 11B is misleading as it suggests the cause of inequality was a one-off 
SBTC shock. What caused the increase in US inequality was that the supply of education slowed down 
and this meant the long-term pressure from SBTC pushed up the skill differentials. Both “blades of the 
scissors” are important in explaining inequality trends. 
 
3.3. Some Problems with the Canonical Model 
 
Overall the canonical supply and demand model does a reasonable job at accounting for the big 
changes in skill differentials over the long-run. But there remain several problems 
1. It cannot explain what has caused “polarization”: the twist in the wage distribution described in 
sub-section 2.3. We discuss this in the next section. 
2. It treats technology as an exogenous process, but surely technology is in part a choice which is 
affected by the economic environment. We discuss this in section 5. 
3. It is silent on what is the firm-level mechanism through which these technological changes are 
affecting the demand for skill. Several authors have tried to investigate these mechanisms by 
                                                 
4 A similar pattern is evident in all US individuals, but because of immigration waves the slowdown in educational 
attainment could be due to increased low skill immigration (e.g. from Mexico). 
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looking at the effects of technology on organization and management within firms using 
detailed micro-data5
4. It cannot easily explain why there are some different trends in wage inequality across countries 
since technology is available across OECD countries. Potentially different trends in educational 
supply could account for these (e.g. Nickell and Bell, 1996) but it seems unlikely that this is the 
full story as nations with similar increases in educational attainment have had very different 
wage trends (e.g. UK and France). It is likely that labour market institutions such as trade 
unions and minimum wages have some role to play
. We return to this in the conclusion. 
6
5. Why should real wages have fallen for the less skilled in the US? Autor and Acemoglu (2010) 
discuss several task-based models that could explain this. 
. 
 
We deal with some of these issues below. 
 
4. Polarization and the effects of ICT on tasks 
 
4.1 Task Biased technical Change 
The technology-based models of labour market change can be expanded to explain polarization by 
considering the way that ICT affects tasks. This begins with the calculations from Nordhaus (2007) 
that the labour cost of performing a standardized computational task has fallen by at least 1.7 trillion 
fold between 1850 and 2006 and that the bulk of this is the last 30 years. The key to understanding the 
impact of computerization is that the main thing that computers can do is to replace routine tasks. 
Tasks which can be codified and replicated are amenable to being replaced by machines and digitized, 
those which are non-routine are much harder to replace. 
 
The standard SBTC story is to see computers and ICT as complementary with highly skilled workers 
and substitutable with less skilled workers. Non-manual workers like economists, doctors, architects, 
financial traders and lawyers find that the easier analysis of large scale data complements the other 
tasks they do. By contrast, manual workers on a production line have found that the repetitive tasks 
they were doing have been largely substituted away by robots. 
 
                                                 
5 For example, see Caroli and Van Reenen (2001), Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) and  Bartel, Ichinowski and 
Shaw (2007) 
6 For example see DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) and Lee (1999) 
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However, this misses the fact that ICT can substitute for non-manual jobs and leave many manual jobs 
unaffected. Everyone has their favourite examples of this, but the robot competitions held in Tokyo 
and elsewhere are nice examples. Robots compete to perform mundane tasks such as to clean, fight 
and kick a ball. Manual tasks which humans have little problem with performing (folding towels or 
vacuuming stairs) are incredibly difficult tasks for robots to master7
 
. These are non-routine activities 
requiring a combination of hand-eye co-ordination and responses to the unforeseen that are hard to 
routinise. Another example would be driving. These types of tasks require little formal education and 
are generally performed by low skilled workers, but they are generally “protected” from routinisation 
by information technologies. 
Consider instead clerical workers. These non-manual workers were more educated than production 
assembly workers, but are involved in many repetitive routine office based tasks. A bank teller was 
involved in standardized processes of banking checks and counting and handing out money. The 
advent of the ATM machine has almost totally replaced this job. Since these types of workers are more 
likely to be in the middle of the wage distribution, this more “nuanced” task biased technical change 
could explain why ICT depresses the demand for middle skilled workers. 
 
 
Figure 13 gives a taxonomy of tasks with the hypothesized effects of ICT on different occupational 
groups. ICT is likely to increase demand for non-manual analytical tasks, but also to substitute for non-
manual clerical and office-based routine tasks. Similarly, while those at the bottom of the skill 
distribution doing production tasks will lose out, most of these types of jobs were gone or offshored by 
the late 1980s. The remaining jobs for the less skilled are predominantly non-routine manual jobs 
whose demand was not much affected by ICT. 
   
4.2 Evidence for Task-biased technical change 
Although the story of task biased technical change seems persuasive on anecdotal evidence, we still do 
not have a great deal of econometric evidence on its prevalence. I describe some of the indirect 
evidence and direct evidence in the next two sub-sections. 
 
                                                 
7 For some examples see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CsS1jnlxf4s&feature=related  
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 4.2.1. Indirect Evidence 
Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) provided the first large-scale quantitative assessment of task-biased 
technical change by examining the skill content of jobs in the US. They accomplished this through a 
detailed analysis of the DOT (the Dictionary of Occupational Tasks, now called O-NET) which 
describes the tasks underlying each a very large number of occupations8
 
. Defining all occupations into 
bundles of tasks allowed Autor et al (2003) to describe the growth of different task in the economy as a 
whole as some occupations grew and others decline. They show that since 1960 there has been a 
secular growth in the importance of analytical jobs and a secular fall in routine manual jobs. By 
contrast, the importance of routine non-manual tasks rose a little in the 1960s, but has also been 
consistently declining since then, which is broadly the period when rapid IT growth took off (e.g. 
Xerox PARC’s Alto microcomputer was first used in 1972 and the IBM PC was introduced in 1981). 
These broad findings of the growth of non-routine jobs and the decline of routine work has also been 
documented in many other OECD countries (e.g. Goos, Manning and Salomons, 2009; Spitz-Oener, 
2006; Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux. 2009). 
 
This evidence suggests a growing role for such tasks, but it is unclear whether the driving force behind 
this change is technology or some other factor. For example, lower trade costs has facilitated 
offshoring of tasks and some of these could be in the middle of the skill distributions (e.g. basic 
analysis of X-rays can be done in India and e-mailed to a physician in Europe cutting out the need for 
some radiologists). Furthermore, the causal importance of this for changes in the overall wage 
structure is unclear. 
 
4.2.2. Direct Evidence 
There is less direct evidence on polarization than SBTC. One approach is Autor and Dorn (2009) who 
use US data from “commuting zones” – geographically contiguous areas that can be consistently 
defined over time. They use the distribution of occupations in a base year to calculate how “routine” 
was the structure of employment prior to the burst of computerization that arguably dramatically 
reduced the demand for routine jobs. They find that these “high routine” areas had the fastest growth 
of non-routine service jobs and also the greatest degree of polarization. 
                                                 
8 A problem with this is that the task content of occupations may change over time. A secretary in the Nineteenth Century, 
for example, was a highly skilled job relating to someone who advised and made major decisions for a principal. The origin 
of the word is from “keeper of the secrets” and also lives on in “Secretary of State” relating to the most senior politician in 
a ministry. By the mid Twentieth Century, however a secretary was a much less prestigious and demanding occupation. 
Authors have tried to deal with this by using DOTs from different years to see how the task content has changed over time. 
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An alternative approach which links up to the earlier literature is Michaels, Natraj and Van Reenen 
(2010, henceforth MNVR) that I will describe in more detail. MNVR begin with the observation that 
the typology of tasks maps naturally into a three-way division of the educational distribution (see 
Figure 13). Analytical tasks, that are complements to IT are performed by the most educated (college 
or beyond). Routine non-manual tasks, like clerical work, has been typically performed by middle 
educated workers (e.g. high school graduates) and non-routine manual work is usually performed by 
the least well educated (e.g. those leaving school before the age of 18). In the past the least educated 
workers would also have performed routine manual jobs, but by the mid 1980s most of these had 
disappeared.  The final column of Table 13 shows this mapping of tasks into educational groups. 
 
MNVR exploit some new sources of industry-level panel data across countries which have a division 
of workers into these three education groups and also a measure of ICT capital, the EU KLEMs data 
(Jorgenson et al, 2008; Timmer et al, 2008). This was constructed through working with the statistical 
agencies in many OECD countries to obtain information on value added, output, employment, ICT 
capital and non-ICT capital, etc. and matching this with aggregated data from surveys of individual 
schooling (e.g. the Current Population Survey in the US and the Labour Force Surveys in Europe). 
This enabled the to construct the wage bill share of each of the three education groups (high, middle 
and low) as a summary measure of the change in skill demand and  
correlate this with the change in ICT.  
 
 
The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 14. Panel A shows that the industries that had the 
greatest growth in ICT intensity between 1980 and 2004 were also those which had the strongest 
growth in the demand for the most educated workers over the same time period. This is unsurprising 
and reproduces the findings of skill biased technical change found in earlier time periods (e.g. Machin 
and Van Reenen, 1998; Berman, Bound and Griliches, 1994). Panel B shows that the demand for 
middle educated workers fell rapidly in those industries that had the greatest growth in ICT intensity. 
Most interesting, perhaps, is Panel C which shows that the least skilled workers were broadly 
unaffected by the growth in ICT intensity. So the effect of ICT appears to complement the most 
educated, substitute for the middle educated and leave the least educated broadly unaffected. 
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We were concerned that this may have been driven by two service sectors that had very strong growth 
in ICT and skilled (finance and telecommunications) so we also repeated all the analyses using just the 
“traded” sectors (manufacturing, agriculture and extraction industries). All figures show the regression 
lines (dashed) on this sub-sample which if anything strengthen the results. 
 
These findings seem very consistent with the task-based view. The routinisation caused by ICT growth 
has had the largest effect on reducing the demand for middle skilled workers and increasing  the 
demand for the most skilled, leaving the least skilled broadly unaffected. ICT is a complement for the 
most skilled, a substitute for the middle skilled and broadly neutral for the least skilled. 
 
It is easy to expand the earlier framework of section 3 to test this idea more formally. Consider a 
representative firm in an industry with a short-run variable cost function, CV(.) of the form: 
 
( , , ; , , )H M LCV W W W C K Q                                                                        (4) 
 
Where, as before, W denotes wages, but we introduce three skill groups instead of just two with 
superscript M for “middle” so MW  is the wage rate of middle skilled workers. In addition to three 
variable factors of production there are two quasi-fixed factors ICT capital (C) and non-ICT capital 
(K). Value added is Q. 
 
If we take a second order flexible functional form for equation (4), such as translog, then by 
Shephard’s Lemma cost minimization implies three labour demand equations: 
 
ln( / ) ln( / ) ln( / ) ln( / ) ln( )S HS H L MS M L CS KS YSSHARE W W W W C Q K Q Qφ φ α α α= + + + +           (5) 
 
Where SSHARE  is the wage bill share of skill group S = {H, M, L}.  
 
MNVR assume that there are national labour markets so that the wage terms can be replaced by a full 
set of country by year dummy interactions. They also take long differences (over a 25 year period) to 
deal with industry-specific fixed effects and measurement error. Their main results are reproduced in 
column (1) of Table 1. Consistent with Figure 14 which pooled across all countries and did not control 
for many other factors they find strong evidence that increases in ICT significantly reduced the 
demand for middle skilled workers (a coefficient on the growth of ICT capital intensity of -65) and 
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increased the demand for the most educated workers (coefficient of 47). There was no significant 
effect of ICT for the least skilled workers (coefficient of 18). 
 
 
These are only correlations, of course, but they do seem consistent with the ICT-based polarization 
story. Further, the results are robust to using initial routinisation levels in the industry as an 
instrumental variable for future ICT growth9
 
.  
4.3. Summary 
The recent polarization of the labour market may be due to ICT causing polarization as routine tasks 
are increasingly performed by machines. There is an emerging empirical literature on this, with recent 
direct of a negative effect of ICT on middle skilled workers which is consistent with task-biased 
technical change. 
 
Nevertheless, there are several alternative stories regarding polarization that have not been investigated 
in much depth. First, it may be that the increase in wealth of the rich has helped stabilize demand for 
the unskilled if preferences are non-homothetic. In other words, if the rich disproportionately demand 
the kind of services the poor supply such as childcare, cleaning, gardening, restaurant meals, etc. then 
this will help place a floor under their wage or job losses (e.g. Mazzolari and Ragusa, 2009).  Second, 
a related story is that increased female labour participation is increasing the demand for many of the 
same low-wage occupations as women’s household production is outsourced (e.g. cleaning, childcare 
and cooking). Ngai and Pissarides (2007) emphasised this mechanism10
 
. Finally, as noted in section 2, 
changes in the labour market could be more related to trade and globalization than technology. We 
turn to trade stories in the next section. 
5. Trade Redux: Trade Induced Technical Change 
 
So far, we have emphasised the importance of technical change as a cause of the shift in the demand 
for more skilled workers. An alternative story as mentioned in section 2 is that trade could have been 
the culprit. The basic story is that integration with less developed countries which are relatively 
                                                 
9 The authors also show robustness to using initial levels of ICT intensity in the US as an instrument under the argument 
that these sectors stood to gain most from the rapid global falls in ICT prices post 1980. 
10 The existing empirical evidence (e.g. Autor and Dorn, 2009, does not find much evidence for either of these 
explanations, however. The ICT-based story seems to empirically dominate in their data. 
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abundant in unskilled workers could put downwards pressure on the wages of these less skilled 
workers. Did inequality rise because wages were now being “set in Beijing?” (Freeman, 1995)? 
 
The evidence in favour of the Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson trade models in explaining 
labour market trends was not strong, however. There are several reasons for this. First, the increase in 
the proportion of skilled workers occurs across all industries, it is a within industry (and even within 
plant according to Dunne et al, 2007) effect rather than a between industry effect. Standard Heckscher-
Ohlin models predict that the increase in skilled workers should be a between industry phenomenon: 
the fact that equilibrium relative wages have risen implies that within industries there should be a fall 
in the proportion of skilled workers (Berman, Bound and Griliches, 1994). Second, trade models 
predict a fall in skill differentials in less developed countries. This has not occurred –if anything there 
has been more of an increase in inequality is developing nations which is more consistent with a 
common skill biased technology shock (Desjonqueres, Machin and Van Reenen, 1999). Third, the 
price trends across different industries did not suggest that trade was important for falls in skill demand 
(Krueger, 1997). Fourth, both calibrated General Equilibrium models and “factor content” analyses of 
the effects of trade found that the magnitudes of the increase in trade with less developed nations was 
too small to account for much of the change in wage inequality. 
 
Finally, observable measures of technology such as ICT (information and communications 
technologies like computers) or Research and Development expenditures (R&D) are strongly 
correlated with the growth in demand for more skilled workers in just about every country (Autor, 
Katz and Krueger, 1998; Machin and Van Reenen, 1998). MNVR illustrate this in the context of Table 
1. When we just include a measure of the change in trade openness11
 
 to column (1) it is strongly 
correlated with increases in the demand for college educated workers. When we also control for 
technology (ICT and R&D), however  the “effect” of trade falls dramatically and is no longer 
economically or statistically significant. The technology values by contrast are positive and 
significantly associated with skill upgrading. 
There were many criticisms of the consensus in labour economics that technology, not trade was the 
main cause of the demand shift towards more skilled workers12
                                                 
11 We use imports plus exports normalized on value added as a measure of openness in the table. Similar results emerge 
from using low wage country imports over value added or other measures of trade (see Michaels et al, 2010). 
.  A first and obvious objection is that 
12 There have been many theoretical extensions to the basic trade model to allow trade to have more subtle effects on 
inequality, for example if we allow for labour market frictions and heterogeneous firms we can obtain non-monotonic 
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the consensus was formed on data that largely predated the rise of the low wage country that has 
transformed the global economy, namely China. In 1980 China accounted for under 1% of the imports 
coming into the US and EU whereas by 2007 it accounted for around 12%. This drove up the 
importance of low country trade for the markets of the OECD. So the reason that trade seemed less 
important could have been just because most researchers were using datasets that ended in the early 
1990s (e.g. Krugman, 2008, reverses his earlier view that trade did not matter in light of the growth of 
China). 
 
A second and deeper objection to the SBTC consensus is that the problem was wrongly posed. 
Researchers saw this as a question of whether trade or technology was the reason for the change in 
skill demand, whereas in reality it is clear that both interrelate. In particular, Wood (1994) speculated 
that greater trade with less developed countries could spur (skill biased) technical change and 
attributed essentially all of the increase in US inequality to trade. Theory models have also been 
developed that show an important role for trade on technology (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1991, 
1992; Acemoglu, 2007).  The problem with trade induced technical change, however, has been in 
finding credible evidence. 
 
A recent contribution here is Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen (2011). The authors use the differential 
growth of Chinese imports across industries to examine the impact of low wage country trade on 
technological change. They construct new firm and plant level datasets with information on close to 
the population of firms for 12 European countries over the 1996-2007 period which saw a huge growth 
of Chinese trade following China’s reforms in the early 1990s. 
 
 
Table 2 shows one set of results from their paper which collapses all their data to industry by country 
cells. Each column presents a regression of a different indicator of technology (computers per worker, 
patents, R&D and total factor productivity) on  the normalized growth of Chinese imports (and a set of 
country by year dummies). Across all columns there is a strong and positive correlation between 
industries that were more exposed to Chinese import competition (such as furniture, textiles, clothing 
and toys) and technological change. These effects are not only statistically significant, they matter 
                                                                                                                                                                      
effects of trade liberalization on inequality (e.g. Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding, 2010). See also Thoenig and Verdier 
(2003) and Acemoglu (2002). 
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economically – the results imply that increased trade with China accounted for around 15% of the 
technological upgrading in Europe 2000-2007. 
 
Bloom et al (2011) decompose these aggregate effects into within firm and between firm components 
by estimating separate equations for firm-level technological change, employment growth and 
survival. They show that about half of the effect of trade on technology in Table 2 is due to the same 
firms having faster technical change (e.g. producing a higher number of patents or a large volume of 
R&D) and about half is due to reallocation whereby the low tech firms tend to shrink and exit as a 
result of Chinese import competition. The latter reallocation effect is now more conventional in the 
heterogeneous trade literature (e.g. Melitz, 2003; Bernard, Redding and Schott, 2007, 2010; Pavcnik, 
2002), but it is reassuring to see it in the data. The within firm effect is more novel, however, and has 
not previously been rigorously shown. Bloom, Romer and Van Reenen (2011) develop a theoretical 
model that seeks to account for this effect based around the idea that the opportunity costs of 
innovation fall after the China shock. 
 
The correlations between technological upgrading and Chinese imports are subject to concerns of 
endogeneity. Note that OLS estimates of the China effect is most likely to be biased downwards due to 
reverse causality as industries which received favourable (unobserved) technology shocks are less 
likely to be attract Chinese imports. Bloom et al (2011) implement several strategies to deal with the 
potential endogeneity of Chinese imports. Their main method is to focus on the textile and clothing 
industries where there was an extensive set of detailed quotas under the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) 
against goods from developing countries. When China joined the World Trade Organization in 
December 2001 it gained access to the phased abolition of the MFA which aimed at removing all 
quotas by 2005. The authors look before and after China joined the WTO to construct instrumental 
variables based on the expected change in the quota regime. Their IV estimates are similar to the OLS 
estimates (if anything slightly larger), suggesting that there really is a causal effect of low wage 
country trade on technological change. In a final step, Bloom et al (2011) show that Chinese imports 
do seem to be having an important effect on demand for skill, but this is mainly through their impact 
on technical change rather than directly.  
 
Finally, it is worth remembering that the standard models examine increased competition in final 
goods markets from trade integration. But trade also affects the incentives of firms to offshore and 
outsource which could affect the within industry shifts in skill demand. For example, Feenstra and 
Hansen (1999) argue that this can account for a larger fraction of shift in skill shares. Indeed, the 
21 
 
routine jobs are those which in general may be easiest to offshore and the loss of such jobs may be due 
to their “offshoreability” rather than their replacement by computers. These are two closely related 
phenomena which need to be probed more deeply. Although there is not a huge literature, most authors 
who have looked at these mechanisms have found a role for both technology and offshoring (e.g. 
Feenstra and Hansen, 1999; Bloom et al, 2011). 
 
6. Conclusions 
The increase in wage inequality has been one of the major topics in labour economics over the last two 
decades, stimulated by the empirical documentation of the large changes in the wage structure. Wage 
inequality grew very fast from the start of the 1980s in the US and UK and this seems to have spread 
across most other OECD countries in later years.  
 
In this paper I have argued that technology has had an important role to play in understanding these 
changes, although its effect is more nuanced than we may have thought a decade ago. My primary 
point is that there is strong evidence that skill biased technical change has maintained upward pressure 
on the demand for the most highly educated workers. But this is a long-term phenomenon and not just 
a feature of the post 1980s period. Overlaid across this trend for increasing skill demand is the increase 
in the supply of human capital. The major problem for the US was that the accumulation of human 
capital slowed down for cohorts entering the labour market in the 1980s, leading to rising skill premia. 
  
Secondly, I pointed to the polarization in the labour market with some evidence that from the mid 
1990s it is the middle part of the wage distribution which appears to be losing ground to the bottom as 
well as the top. In all OECD countries, the “middle class” occupations appear to be shrinking relative 
to those in the bottom third (e.g. cleaners, restaurant workers, retail sales workers, hairdressers, etc.) as 
well as the top third. This may also be related to information and communication technologies (ICT) 
which have been consistently replacing “routine” tasks. These routine tasks at first came from manual 
workers, such as those on production lines, but as these jobs disappear, increasingly it has been more 
non-manual routine jobs (e.g. bank clerks) that have been replaced. There is some evidence of this 
“shrinking middle” in the data, with the middle educated workers seeing the biggest falls in sectors 
more affected by ICT accumulation. 
 
Finally, I emphasised the importance of endogenising technical change. In particular, there is evidence 
that trade with low wage countries such as China leads to faster technology upgrading as OECD firms 
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are forced to “innovate or die”. Thus trade creates additional dynamic benefits through increasing 
productivity, but also has major effects on the labour market. 
 
The changing labour market and its relationship to technology and trade will continue to be a major 
area of interest for economists. I end with a research question and a policy question. On research, the 
standard approach has been to look for broad evidence of the roles of environmental shifts on labour 
demand and supply such as technology, trade and institutions. But what are the micro-mechanisms 
through which technological changes affect skill demand and productivity? There is a flourishing field 
of work examining the organizational structure of firms and how these react to technological and trade 
shocks. Traditionally this has been in business school case studies, but increasingly within firm 
datasets are becoming available to tackle these issues econometrically. This crosses over the fields of 
Personnel economics, organizational economics and international economics (e.g. Shaw, 2010; Bartel 
et al, 2007, Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007).  
 
On the policy side, the implications of the canonical model discussed above were that increases in the 
supply of human capital is the only long-term way to prevent inequality rising.  But the recent changes 
make this simple recommendation less clear. For a potential high school drop-out, it is clear that 
becoming a college graduate is a more attractive proposition. But the recommendation to stay on to 
graduate high school becomes less compelling if the shifts in demand away from high school graduates 
continue. Furthermore, the explosion of pay for the very top of the distribution (the top 1% or 0.1%) is 
not something that could be mitigated by expanding the supply of education.  
 
The problem this poses is that although the social planner may place a larger weight on those at the 
bottom of the distribution (with a high marginal value of consumption) than the top, the political 
process does not. The median voters are in the middle of the income distribution and if they feel 
increasingly “squeezed” from both rich and poor they will be attracted to policies which seek to 
reverse these trends. Some might be straight policies of redistribution. Others might be to place 
barriers to trade or technological developments that lead them to be losing out. It is no wonder that 
there are so many “Middle Class Taskforces” that have been created throughout the governments of 
the OECD to placate their growing anger. 
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FIGURE 1: US MALE WAGE INEQUALITY, 1937-2005
Source: Goldin and Katz (2008)
FIGURE 2: UK 90-10 LOG WEEKLY EARNINGS RATIOS, 
FULL-TIME, 1970-2009
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FIGURE 3, PANEL A: CHANGE IN MALE WAGE 
INEQUALITY (90-10) OECD COUNTRIES IN THE 1980S
Note: This is the changes in the 90-10, so a value of 0.6 for UK indicates that the
ratio rose from 2.7 in 1980 to 3.3 in 1990.  
Source: Machin and Van Reenen (2010), OECD
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FIGURE 3, PANEL B : CHANGE IN MALE WAGE INEQUALITY 
(90-10) OECD COUNTRIES IN THE 1990’S & 2000’S
Source: Machin and Van Reenen (2010), OECD
Note: Netherlands has a break in series in 1993
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FIGURE 4: FROM MONOTONIC WIDENING TO 
POLARISATION? US DATA
Source: Autor, Katz & Kearney (2008)
Note: US CPS MORG; Source: Goldin and Katz (2008)
FIGURE 5, PANEL A: DIVERGENCE OF UPPER HALF (90-50 
LOG HOURLY WAGE) & LOWER HALF (50-10) INEQUALITY, 
1975-2005, US DATA
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FIGURE 5, PANEL B: DIVERGENCE OF UPPER (90-50 LOG 
EARNINGS) & LOWER HALF (50-10) INEQUALITY, FULL-TIME 
MEN, 1970-2009, UK DATA
Source: Machin and Van Reenen (2010)
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FIGURE 6: LOVELY AND LOUSY JOBS: EMPLOYMENT SHARE
GROWTH 1979-2008 BY JOB QUALITY (OCCUPATIONAL
WAGE), UK
Source: Mieske (2009), updates Goos and Manning (2007), % changes 
for entire period
FIGURE 7: CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT SHARES BY 
OCCUPATION IN 16 EU COUNTRIES, OCCUPATIONS GROUPED 
BY WAGE TERCILE, 1993-2006
Source: Autor (2010) based on data in Goos, Manning & Salomons (2010)
FIGURE 8: TOP 1% SHARE OF ALL INCOME: ENGLISH 
SPEAKING COUNTRIES, 1910-2007
Source: Atkinson, Piketty and Saez  (2011)
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FIGURE 9: COLLEGE DEGREE VS. HIGH SCHOOL 
DIPLOMA WEEKLY WAGE RATIO (COMPOSITION 
ADJUSTED) 1963-2008, US, ALL WORKERS
Notes: Series is adjusted for experience, race and gender (not 
unobservables).
Source: Acemoglu & Autor (2010), March CPS, log(weekly wages) for full-
time full year workers.
FIGURE 10: LIKE WAGES, A BIG INCREASE IN 
DISPERSION OF WITHIN SECTOR PRODUCTIVITY 
ACROSS UK FIRMS 
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Fig.5b: Productivity dispersion in manufacturing and private services
90th percentile (↑57 log points)
10th percentile (↑18 log points)
Notes: Productivity measured by sales per worker (similar results for TFP)
Source: Faggio, Van Reenen & Salvanes (2010)
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FIGURE 11, PANEL A: THE CANONICAL MODEL
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FIGURE 11, PANEL B: SHIFT IN RELATIVE SUPPLY NEEDS
SHIFT IN RELATIVE DEMAND TO RATIONALIZE INEQUALITY
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FIGURE 12: MEAN YEARS OF SCHOOLING BY BIRTH 
COHORT
Task type Task description Example of 
occupations
Effect of ICT Education 
Levels
Routine Manual Rules based; 
repetitive; 
procedural
Assembly line 
workers;
Direct 
substitution
Low
Non-
Manual
Clerical ; 
Book-keepers
Direct 
substitution
Middle
Non-
Routine
Non-
Manual
Abstract  problem 
solving (analytic); 
mental flexibility
Managers; doctors; 
lawyers; scientists
Strongly 
complementary
High
Manual Environmental 
adaptability; 
Interpersonal 
adaptability
Maids/Janitors; 
security guards; 
waiters; drivers
Broadly Neutral Low
FIGURE 13: A TAXONOMY OF TASKS, EDUCATION AND 
THE EFFECTS OF ICT
Note: Figure plots the growth from 1980-2004 of high-skilled wage bill shares against the growth of ICT intensity (ICT/VA), by
industry, averaged across countries. Lines show fitted values from regressions weighted by the cross-country average of each
industry’s share in 1980 employment (solid line for entire economy, dashed line for non-trade industries only).
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Figure 3A:Growth of High-Skilled Share
Whole Economy and Nontraded Industries
FIGURE 14, PANEL A: CROSS INDUSTRY GROWTH IN 
COLLEGE WAGE BILL SHARE & ICT INTENSITY, AVERAGE 
ACROSS 11 OECD COUNTRIES, 1980-2004
Regression Line: 
whole economy
Regression Line: 
Non-traded only
Source: Michaels, Natraj and Van Reenen (2010)
Note: Figure plots the growth from 1980-2004 of medium-skilled wage bill shares against the growth of ICT intensity
(ICT/VA), by industry, averaged across countries. Lines show fitted values from regressions weighted by the cross-
country average of each industry’s share in 1980 employment (solid line for entire economy, dashed line for non-trade
industries only).
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Figure 4A:Growth of Medium-Skilled Share
Whole Economy and Nontraded Industries
FIGURE 14, PANEL B: CROSS INDUSTRY GROWTH IN  MEDIUM
EDUCATED WAGE  BILL SHARE & ICT INTENSITY, AVERAGE 
ACROSS 11 COUNTRIES, 1980-2004, ALL SECTORS 
Regression Line: 
whole economy
Regression Line: 
Non-traded only
Source: Michaels, Natraj and Van Reenen (2010)
Note: Figure plots the growth from 1980-2004 of low-skilled wage bill shares against the growth of ICT intensity
(ICT/VA), by industry, averaged across countries. Lines show fitted values from regressions weighted by the
cross-country average of each industry’s share in 1980 employment (solid line for entire economy, dashed line for
non-trade industries only).
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Figure 5A:Growth of Low-Skilled Share
Whole Economy and Nontraded Industries
FIGURE 14, PANEL C: CROSS INDUSTRY GROWTH IN  LOW
EDUCATED WAGE  BILL SHARE & ICT INTENSITY, AVERAGE 
ACROSS 11 COUNTRIES, 1980-2004
Regression Line: 
whole economy
Regression Line: 
Non-traded only
Source: Michaels, Natraj and Van Reenen (2010)
A. Dependent variable: ΔCollege Wage Bill Share
Δ ((ICT capital) / (Value Added)) 46.92
(14.94)
B. Dependent variable: ΔMedium-skilled Wage Bill Share
Δ ((ICT capital) / (Value Added)) -64.52
(20.24)
C. Dependent variable: ΔLow-skilled Wage Bill Share
Δ ((ICT capital) / (Value Added)) 17.71
(16.41)
Observations 208
Note: Industry by country panel; estimated by OLS in long differences (robust standard errors), 
controls: 11 country dummies, growth in ln(non-ICT capital/value added) and ln(value added). Up 
to 27 industries in each country
Source: Michaels, Natraj and Van Reenen (2010 )
TABLE 1: GROWTH OF WAGE BILL SHARES, 1980-2004
TABLE 2: GROWTH OF CHINESE IMPORTS INCREASES 
SPEED OF TECHNICAL CHANGE
Note: 5 year differences. Four Digit industry (up to 371 sectors) by country (12) 
regressions. Controls for year by country dummies included.
Source: Draca, Bloom and Van Reenen (2011) 
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